

Syntactic Logical Relations for Perfect Encryption, Higher-Order References and First-Class Channels



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What is a Logical Relation?

A relation $?v \sim w : \tau$ between values v and w in a typed λ -calculus, defined according to their type τ

E.g.,

■ $?i \sim j : \text{int} \Leftrightarrow i = j$

■ $?f \sim g : \sigma \rightarrow \tau \Leftrightarrow$

$? \text{eval}(f v) \sim \text{eval}(g w) : \tau$ for any $?v \sim w : \sigma$

■ $? (v_1, v_2) \sim (w_1, w_2) : \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \Leftrightarrow$

$?v_1 \sim w_1 : \tau_1$ and $?v_2 \sim w_2 : \tau_2$

What is it Useful for?

- # To show various forms of equivalence between programs

- Correctness of optimization

$$? \rho_{\text{opt}} \sim \rho_{\text{unopt}} : \tau$$

- Secrecy as non-interference

$$? \rho_v \sim \rho_w : \tau \text{ for } v \neq w$$

- Correspondence between CPS and direct style

$$? \rho_{\text{CPS}} \sim \rho_{\text{DS}} : \tau$$

etc

The "Fundamental Property" of Logical Relations

Theorem:

$$v_1 \sim v_2 : \tau \text{ for any } v_1, v_2 : \tau$$

Corollary:

$$v_1 \sim v_2 : \tau \Rightarrow \text{eval}(f v_1) = \text{eval}(f v_2) \\ \text{for any } f : \tau \rightarrow \text{bool}$$

I.e., logical relations imply
observational equivalence

This Talk

- # Logical relations for wider range of programming constructs
 - Perfect encryption [Sumii-Pierce 01]
Cf. Type abstraction [Reynolds 83]
 - Higher-order references [ongoing work]
 - First-class channels [ongoing work]

Everything is syntactic and operational

Perfect Encryption

$M ::= \dots$ (standard λ -terms)
| k (key)
| $\text{new } k \text{ in } M$ (key generation)
| $\{M\}_N$ (encryption)
| $\text{let } \{x\}_{M_1} = M_2 \text{ in } N_1 \text{ else } N_2$ (decryption)

Useful for reasoning about information hiding by encryption (as in security protocols)

Example of Equivalence by Perfect Encryption

new k in

$(\{3\}_k, \lambda c. \text{let } \{i\}_k = c \text{ in } (i \bmod 2) \text{ else } -1)$

\cong

new k in

$(\{5\}_k, \lambda c. \text{let } \{i\}_k = c \text{ in } (i \bmod 2) \text{ else } -1)$

Cf. equivalence by type abstraction

$\text{pack int}, (3, \lambda i. i \bmod 2) \text{ as } \exists \alpha. \alpha \times (\alpha \rightarrow \text{int})$

\cong

$\text{pack int}, (5, \lambda j. j \bmod 2) \text{ as } \exists \alpha. \alpha \times (\alpha \rightarrow \text{int})$

Logical Relation for Perfect Encryption [Sumii-Pierce 01]

Introduce relation environment φ to associate each key k with a relation $\varphi(k)$ between values encrypted by k

$\varphi \ ? \ \{v\}_k \sim \{w\}_{k'} : \text{bits} \Leftrightarrow$

$k = k' \text{ and } (v, w) \in \varphi(k)$

$\varphi \ ? \ \text{new } k \text{ in } M \sim \text{new } k \text{ in } N : \tau \Leftrightarrow$

$\varphi, k \mapsto r \ ? \ M \sim N : \tau \text{ for some } r$

Cf. Logical Relation for Type Abstraction [Reynolds 83]

Associate each abstract type α with a relation $\varphi(\alpha)$ between values implementing α

$$\varphi \ ? \ v \sim w : \alpha \iff (v, w) \in \varphi(\alpha)$$

$$\varphi \ ? \ \text{pack } \rho, v \text{ as } \exists \alpha. \tau$$

$$\sim \ \text{pack } \sigma, w \text{ as } \exists \alpha. \tau : \exists \alpha. \tau \iff$$

$$\varphi, \alpha \mapsto r \ ? \ v \sim w : \tau$$

for some relation $r \subseteq \rho \times \sigma$

Extended Logical Relation: Motivating Example

new k_1 in new k_2 in
($\{k_2\}_{k_1}, \lambda c. \text{let } \{k_2'\}_{k_1} = c \text{ in } \{3\}_{k_2}. \text{ else } \dots$)

\cong

new k_1 in new k_2 in
($\{k_2\}_{k_1}, \lambda c. \text{let } \{k_2'\}_{k_1} = c \text{ in } \{5\}_{k_2}. \text{ else } \dots$)

What to take as $\varphi(k_1)$?

k_2 is yet to be generated!

Extended Logical Relation: Our Solution

Parameterize φ with respect to a relation environment ψ in the future

$$\varphi ? \{v\}_k \sim \{w\}_{k'} : \text{bits} \Leftrightarrow k = k' \text{ and } (v, w) \in \varphi_\varphi(k)$$

E.g., take

$$\varphi_\psi(k_1) = \{ (k_2, k_2) \mid \psi_\psi(k_2) = \{(3, 5)\} \}$$

in the motivating example

References

$M ::= \dots$	(standard λ -terms)
ℓ	(location)
$\text{let } \ell = \text{ref } M \text{ in } N$	(cell allocation)
$M := N$	(update)
$!M$	(dereference)

Example of Equivalence by References

let $\ell = \text{ref } 0$ in $(\lambda x. !\ell, \lambda y. \ell := !\ell + 2)$

\cong

let $\ell = \text{ref } 0$ in $(\lambda x. !\ell \times 2, \lambda y. \ell := !\ell + 1)$

Logical Relation for First-Order References

Associate each location l with a relation $\varphi(l)$ between values stored in l

φ ? let $l = \text{ref } v$ in M

~ let $l = \text{ref } w$ in $N : \tau \Leftrightarrow$

$\varphi, l \mapsto r$? $M \sim N : \tau$ for some $r \in \varphi(l)$ (v, w)

φ ? $(l := v) \sim (l' := w) : \text{unit} \Leftrightarrow$

$l = l'$ and $(v, w) \in \varphi(l)$

Logical Relation for Higher-Order References

What about "references to references"?

— The same as "keys encrypting keys"!

(I don't have so interesting examples, though)

Channels

$M ::= \dots$ (standard λ -terms)
| c (channel)
| $\text{new } c \text{ in } M$ (channel creation)
| $\text{send } M \text{ to } N$ (output)
| $\text{recv } x \text{ from } M \text{ in } N$ (input)

cf. π -calculus [Milner 89]

Example of Equivalence by Channels

new c in

(send 3 to c, recv i from c in (i mod 2))

\cong

new c in

(send 5 to c, recv i from c in (i mod 2))

Logical Relation for Second-Class Channels

Associate each channel c with a relation $\varphi(c)$ between values communicated through c

$\varphi ? \text{new } c \text{ in } M \sim \text{new } c \text{ in } N : \tau \Leftrightarrow$

$\varphi, c \mapsto r ? M \sim N : \tau$ for some r

$\varphi ? \text{send } v \text{ to } c \sim \text{send } w \text{ to } c' : \text{unit} \Leftrightarrow$

$c = c'$ and $(v, w) \in \varphi(c)$

$\varphi ? \text{recv } x \text{ from } c \text{ in } M$

$\sim \text{recv } x \text{ from } c' \text{ in } N : \tau \Leftrightarrow$

$c = c'$ and $\varphi ? [v/x]M \sim [w/x]N : \tau$

for any $(v, w) \in \varphi(c)$

Logical Relation for First-Class Channels

What about "channels passing channels"?

— Again, the same as keys encrypting keys

More interesting (than references to references) because first-class channels are essential in π -calculus

A Use of First-Class Channels: Client-Server System

new succserv in

(recv (m, c) from succserv in

(send (m + 1) to c,

new d in

(send (2, d) to succserv,

(recv n from d in ...))

Or, Equivalently...

new idserv in

(recv (m, c) from idserv in

send m to c,

new d in

(send (3, d) to idserv,

recv n from d in ...))

To show the equivalence, take

$\phi_{\psi}(\text{idserv}) =$

$\{ ((2, c), (3, c)) \mid \psi_{\psi}(c) = \{(3, 3)\} \}$

Conclusion (1/2): Summary

- # We have seen logical relations for
 - Perfect encryption
Cf. type abstraction
 - Higher-order references
 - First-class channels

All of these are based on the same idea:
associating each generative name n
with a relation $\varphi(n)$ between values
involved in n

Conclusion (2/2): Future Work

- # More applications (other than security protocols)
- # Soundness proofs (except for logical relations for encryption)
- # Completeness results
- # Comparison with other methods (such as bisimulation)

Suggestions and discussions welcome!