Type-Based Verification of Correspondence Assertions for Communication Protocols

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Outline

Introduction

- CA: -Calculus with Correspondence Assertions
- Type and Effect System
- Type Checking Algorithm
- Related Work and Conclusion

Correspondence Assertions

- Formal notation for stating expected <u>authenticity</u> properties [Woo and Lam, '93]
 - Authenticity: Guarantee there are no falsification of messages and pretender of protocol users

Type and Effect system for checking correspondence assertions [Gordon and Jeffrey, '01] (GJ's type system)

- Advantage (over other verification methods)
 Efficiency
- Disadvantage
 - Complicated type annotations

This Work


- Extension of GJ's type system with fractional effects
 - Polynomial-time type inference
 - More expressive power
- Proof of NP-hardness of GJ's type system (without type annotations)

Outline


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Example: Transmit-Acknowledge-Handshake protocol



Safety

 Definition: A process *P* is *safe* if whenever an end-event occurs in *P*, the corresponding begin-event must have occurred before

Example:

- begin <x>.end <x> : safe
- begin <x>.end <x>.end <x> : unsafe
- begin <x>.begin <x>.end <x> : safe

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Key Idea of Type System

Extend channel types with information about capabilities for raising end-events

• Example:

■ Ch()[<x>| 1]

a channel used for passing a unit value and the capability for raising one *end* <*x*> event

Ch(Name)[<1>| 2]

 a channel used for passing a name value and
 the capability for raising two end-events on the name

Syntax of Types and Effects

■ T ::= Name Name Type $|Ch(T_1,...,T_n)e$ Channel Type capabilities passed through the channel • e ::= $\begin{bmatrix} L_1 & q_1, \dots, L_n & q_n \end{bmatrix}$ Fractional Effects non-negative rational numbers Extended Event Labels ■ L ::= < $_1, ..., _k$ > **Extended Names** ::= X ::= |1|2|... Indices

Type Judgment

Assumptions about how the names may be used P:e Capabilities of end-events that P may raise

Example:

- x:Name begin <x>.end <x>:[]
- x:Ch(Name)[<1>l 1]/x?[y].end <y>.end <y>:[]
- x:Ch()[<y>| 0.5] x?[].x?[].end <y>:[]

Difference from GJ's type system

	GJ's type system	Our type system
Effects	Mapping from event labels to natural numbers	Mapping from event labels to rational numbers
Type annotations	Explicit	Implicit
Channel Type Representation	Name Based Ch(x:Name)[<x>]</x>	Index Based Ch(Name)[<1>I 1]



$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P : e + [L \mapsto 1] \quad N(L) \subseteq dom(\Gamma)}{\Gamma \vdash begin \ L.P : e} (T - Begin)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P:e \quad N(L) \subseteq dom(\Gamma)}{\Gamma \vdash end \ L.P:e + [L \mapsto 1]} (T - End)$$

Typing Rules

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x : Ch(T)e \quad \Gamma \vdash y : [y/\uparrow 1]\Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x![y] : [y/1]e} (T - Out)$$

$$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x} : Ch(T)e_1 \quad \Gamma, \mathbf{y} : T' \vdash P : e_2 T' = \left[\mathbf{y}/\uparrow 1 \right] \Gamma \quad \mathbf{e} + \left[\mathbf{y}/1 \right] e_1 \ge e_2 \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x}?[\mathbf{y}].P : \mathbf{e}$$
 (T-In)

Type Soundness

Theorem: If P:[], then P is safe

Proof:

Essentially the same as the proof of the type soundness theorem of GJ's type system

Comparison with GJ's Type System

 Our type system is strictly more expressive than GJ's type system

Example: P = (begin <a>.(c![] | c![])) | (c?[].c?[].end <a>)


Typable in our type system
 c:Ch()[<a>| 0.5] P:[]

Untypable in GJ's type system

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Type Checking Algorithm




Example: Transmit-Acknowledge-Handshake protocol

(c:Ch(Name,Ch() $_0$) $_c$) (Sender(a:Name,b:Name, c:Ch(Name,Ch() $_0$) $_c$)|...): sys Sender(a:Name,b:Name, c:Ch(Name,Ch() $_0$) $_c$): $_s =$ (msq:Name)(ack:Ch() $_{ack}$)

(c![msg:Name,ack:Ch() _{ack}] | ack?[].end <a,b,msg>)

.

Step 1: Constraint Generation




Step 2: Constraint Reduction

Relevant events:

Conversion of inequalities:

Step 3: Solve Linear Inequalities

Inequalities:



Efficiency of the Algorithm

 Assumption: Both the size of simple types and that of event labels are bounded by a constant

Step 1: polynomial in the size of input *P*

Step 2: polynomial in the size of constraints

Step 3: polynomial in the size of linear inequalities

The whole procedure runs in time polynomial in |P|

Complexity of GJ's Type System

- The typability in GJ's type system is NP-hard without type annotations
- Proof:

Reduction of 3-SAT problem into the typechecking problem in GJ's type system

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Related Work

- Extended type and effect system
 [Gordon and Jeffrey, '01-'03]
 - Verify authenticity of cryptographic protocols in spi-calculus
- Fractional effects
 [Boyland, '03][Terauchi and Aiken, '06]
 - Prevent interference of read/write operations on reference cells or channels

Conclusion

- Extended Gordon and Jeffrey's type system for checking correspondence assertions
 - Fractional effects for polynomial-time type inference and more expressive power
- Proved NP-hardness of GJ's type system (without type annotations)

Future work

- Extension of the type system to deal with cryptographic primitives
- Implementation of a protocol verification tool



Thank you for listening to my presentation

Index Constructors

Example:

• c:Ch(Name,Ch()[<
$$1$$
>| 1])[< 1 >| 1]
corresponds to

c':Ch(x:Name,y:Ch()[<x>])[<x>]

in GJ's type system